

Haig, probably concerned about Lloyd George’s attitude to further attritional battles in 1917, put a 48-hour time limit on the operation. Lloyd George, in his eagerness to have the Third Ypres offensive closed off, insisted on British divisions being sent to reinforce Italy this diverted troops who could have been utilised as reserves at Cambrai. Additionally, the Italian defeat at Caporetto on 24 October was to have a most serious affect on the plan. This alone was to undermine probably the main strategic reason for Cambrai going ahead: if it was to be a diversion for Third Ypres, it was necessary for the attack to be launched before Third Ypres was wound down.
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Although the two ideas had reached Byng by the end of August, the operation did not achieve final approval from GHQ until October. Other factors now started to affect Byng’s plan. Whilst combining the two plans was a brilliant combination of two independently conceived ideas, by introducing the cavalry – a tool of potential exploitation – he was sowing the seeds of the plan’s destruction. The Tudor plan for the trench raid went via IV Corps to Byng on 23 August.īyng perceived the combined plan as a great opportunity for the cavalry, once the German lines had been breached. This was a technique whereby the known variables in a gun’s shooting, such as atmospheric conditions and barrel wear, were taken into account thus allowing an artillery piece to start its barrage without giving away its intentions by having to first register on its target. Tudor’s plan relied upon a predicted barrage. Tudor envisaged the artillery shooting from the map – a technique that had never been tried before. Independently of Fuller, Brig-Gen H H ‘Owen’ Tudor, CRA 9th (Scottish) Division had drawn up a plan for a trench raid, which would be launched without any preliminary bombardment, using tanks to cut the German barbed wire. Byng, coincidentally, had been ordered to prepare a diversion for Third Ypres - more usually known as Passchendaele - (this diversion to be aimed at the Flesquieres Ridge ) and Fuller’s plan, which arrived with Byng during the first week in August, fitted in with this order very well. This evolved into the operation at Cambrai.īrig-Gen H Elles, commanding the Tank Corps, took the plan to both GHQ and to General Byng, the new Third Army commander. He initially devised an Anglo-French attack supported by tanks, to capture St Quentin. The plan for the battle came about as a result of an idea initially put forward by Lt-Col JFC Fuller, GSO1 of the Tank Corps. The reasons for the failure to achieve everything that was hoped for may have started at the planning stage.

Clearly they had to understand what had gone right but, perhaps, more importantly, what had gone wrong. The Battle of Cambrai - general area (Map image courtesy Probert Encyclopedia)Ĭambrai was to give the British GHQ food for thought over the winter. Although the Germans would apply what they had learned first, it was to be the British who were to be the more successful at putting the new developments into practice. For the British, especially, the battle failed to live up to the initial expectations but lessons were learned by both sides. The lessons of the operational successes and failures would be digested by both sides over the forthcoming winter.

#Wendy panzer general how to#
The Battle of Cambrai in November 1917 turned out, for both Britain and Germany, to be a major signpost showing how to break the trench deadlock of the previous three years. The 'fake' French Aristocrat at Etaples.‘A gallant duel’ - SS Otaki and the Moewe.The George Cecil Memorial at Villers-Cotterets by Michael Aidin.Guillemont, 3 September 1916 Tactics and Insights by Sebastian Laudan.Stereography in the Great War (in three parts) Part I.A Royal Navy rating discharged as epileptic and destined for the Asylum.Ivor Thord-Gray - Mercenary, Spy? Thief? … and CO 11th Northumberland Fusiliers by Peter Hodgkinson.A short and unequal engagement: HMS Strongbow and HMS Mary Rose.RNAS Caldale, Orkney and the loss of two airships.
